巴菲特給股東的信 1978年 Part3

Textiles

紡織業

Earnings of $1.3 million in 1978, while much improved from 1977, still
represent a low return on the $17 million of capital employed in this
business. Textile plant and equipment are on the books for a very small
fraction of what it would cost to replace such equipment today. And,
despite the age of the equipment, much of it is functionally similar to new
equipment being installed by the industry. But despite this “bargain cost” of
fixed assets, capital turnover is relatively low reflecting required high
investment levels in receivables and inventory compared to sales. Slow
capital turnover, coupled with low profit margins on sales, inevitably
produces inadequate returns on capital. Obvious approaches to improved
profit margins involve differentiation of product, lowered manufacturing
costs through more efficient equipment or better utilization of people,
redirection toward fabrics enjoying stronger market trends, etc. Our
management is diligent in pursuing such objectives. The problem, of
course, is that our competitors are just as diligently doing the same thing.

1978年的盈餘達到130萬美元，較1977年有所改進，但相較於投入的1,700萬資
本來說，報酬率還是很低，目前紡織廠房及設備帳列的價值遠低於未來重置所需的成
本，雖然這些設備都已相當老舊，但大部分的功能與目前同業所採用的全新設備差異
並不大，但盡管固定資產的投入不須太大，但銷售所須負擔的應收帳款及存貨週轉資
金卻是相當沈重的擔子，紡織業低資產週轉率與低毛利無可避免地造成低落的股東權
益報酬率，可能的改善方式包括產品差異化、使用新設備降低製造成本或妥善運用人
力、朝高附加價值的紡織品轉型等，我們的管理階層正致力達到以上目標，當然真正
的問題在於這也正是我們的競爭同業正在努力做的。

The textile industry illustrates in textbook style how producers of
relatively undifferentiated goods in capital intensive businesses must earn
inadequate returns except under conditions of tight supply or real shortage.
As long as excess productive capacity exists, prices tend to reflect direct
operating costs rather than capital employed. Such a supply-excess
condition appears likely to prevail most of the time in the textile industry,
and our expectations are for profits of relatively modest amounts in relation
to capital.

紡織業的現況充分地說明了教科書中提到的，當資本密集但產品無重大差異化的生產
者註定將賺取微薄的報酬，除非供給吃緊或真正短缺，只要市場產能過剩，產品價格
就會隨直接營運成本而非投入資金作變動，不幸的是這樣的情況正是目前紡織業的常
態，所以我們只能期望獲取稍微合理的投資報酬即可。

We hope we don’t get into too many more businesses with such tough
economic characteristics. But, as we have stated before: (1) our textile
businesses are very important employers in their communities, (2)
management has been straightforward in reporting on problems and
energetic in attacking them, (3) labor has been cooperative and
understanding in facing our common problems, and (4) the business should
average modest cash returns relative to investment. As long as these
conditions prevail - and we expect that they will - we intend to continue to
support our textile business despite more attractive alternative uses for
capital.

我們希望以後不要再介入這類產業面臨困境的企業，但就像之前曾經提到的，只要(1)
該公司為當地非常重要的雇主(2)管理當局坦誠面對困境並努力解決問題(3)勞工體認
現況並極力配合(4)相對於投入的資金，尚能產生穩定現金收入。只要以上前提存在，
我們也相信一定會，我們就會繼續支持紡織事業的營運，雖然這樣將使得我們被迫放
棄其他更有利的資金運用管道。

Insurance Underwriting

保險核保業務

The number one contributor to Berkshire’s overall excellent results in
1978 was the segment of National Indemnity Company’s insurance operation
run by Phil Liesche. On about $90 million of earned premiums, an
underwriting profit of approximately $11 million was realized, a truly
extraordinary achievement even against the background of excellent
industry conditions. Under Phil’s leadership, with outstanding assistance by
Roland Miller in Underwriting and Bill Lyons in Claims, this segment of
National Indemnity (including National Fire and Marine Insurance Company,
which operates as a running mate) had one of its best years in a long history
of performances which, in aggregate, far outshine those of the industry.
Present successes reflect credit not only upon present managers, but equally
upon the business talents of Jack Ringwalt, founder of National Indemnity,
whose operating philosophy remains etched upon the company.

1978年Berkshire盈餘貢獻的第一功臣當屬由Phil Liesche所帶領的國家產險公
司，在所賺取的9,000萬美元保費收入當中，有1,100萬美元是已實現的核保利益，
即便是產業情況不錯的環境下仍屬相當難得，在Phil的領導以及Roland Miller核保
部門與Bill Lyons理賠部門的襄助之下，國家產險(包含國家火海險公司)創下有史以
來表現最佳的一年，其表現更遠優於其他同業，如今的成功不僅反應出現任經營者的
功勞，還要歸功於國家產險創辦人Jack Ringwalt的遠見，其經營哲學目前仍深深烙
印在公司之上。

Home and Automobile Insurance Company had its best year since John
Seward stepped in and straightened things out in 1975. Its results are
combined in this report with those of Phil Liesche’s operation under the
insurance category entitled “Specialized Auto and General Liability”.

去年是家庭汽車保險公司自1975年John Seward介入並改正公司營運以來表現最佳
的一年，其成績連同Phil的營運績效一起被放在特殊汽車及一般責任險業務範圍之
內。

Worker’s Compensation was a mixed bag in 1978. In its first year as a
subsidiary, Cypress Insurance Company, managed by Milt Thornton, turned
in outstanding results. The worker’s compensation line can cause large
underwriting losses when rapid inflation interacts with changing social
concepts, but Milt has a cautious and highly professional staff to cope with
these problems. His performance in 1978 has reinforced our very good
feelings about this purchase.

1978年勞工退休保險是一個混合體，在她被列為Milt Thornton管理的Cypress保
險公司子公司的第一年便繳出漂亮的成績單，勞工退休保險業務在通貨膨脹加劇以及
社會觀念改變的情況下，有可能產生鉅額的核保損失，但Milt擁有一組謹慎且極度專
業的團隊小心處理這些問題， 1978年他的表現使我們對於買進這項業務開始有不錯
的感覺。

Frank DeNardo came with us in the spring of 1978 to straighten out
National Indemnity’s California Worker’s Compensation business which, up
to that point, had been a disaster. Frank has the experience and intellect
needed to correct the major problems of the Los Angeles office. Our volume
in this department now is running only about 25% of what it was eighteen
months ago, and early indications are that Frank is making good progress.

Frank DeNardo是在1978年春天加入我們改正國家產險在加州勞工退休保險業務
的行列，當時這項業務可以說是一場災難，Frank具有導正加州辦公室問題所需的經
驗與智慧，目前這個部門的業務量只有一年半前的四分之一，初步的結果顯示Frank
已有相當好的開始。

George Young’s reinsurance department continues to produce very
large sums for investment relative to premium volume, and thus gives us
reasonably satisfactory overall results. However, underwriting results still
are not what they should be and can be. It is very easy to fool yourself
regarding underwriting results in reinsurance (particularly in casualty lines
involving long delays in settlement), and we believe this situation prevails
with many of our competitors. Unfortunately, self-delusion in company
reserving almost always leads to inadequate industry rate levels. If major
factors in the market don’t know their true costs, the competitive “fall-out”
hits all - even those with adequate cost knowledge. George is quite willing
to reduce volume significantly, if needed, to achieve satisfactory
underwriting, and we have a great deal of confidence in the long term
soundness of this business under his direction.

George Young的再保險部門創造的保費收入持續挹注投資所需的大量資金，並繳出
相當令人滿意的成績單，只是核保部門的績效依舊不如預期理想，再保險的核保成績
很容易讓人搞錯(尤其是理賠時間通常拉得很長的意外險業務)，而我們相信其他同業
普遍也面臨這樣的問題，不幸的是，公司損失準備提列的自我迷惑通常導致不當的保
險費率結構，如果市場上的主要份子對於自身的成本結構不甚了解，那麼競爭爆炸的
結果是傷到所有的參與者，也包含那些具有成本意識的業者在內，如果有必要的話，
為達到合理的核保績效，George寧願捨棄大部分的業務，而我們也有信心就長期而
言，這項業務在他的領導之下會有不錯的表現。