巴菲特給股東的信 1978年 Part1

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致Berkshire公司全體股東:

First, a few words about accounting. The merger with Diversified
Retailing Company, Inc. at yearend adds two new complications in the
presentation of our financial results. After the merger, our ownership of
Blue Chip Stamps increased to approximately 58% and, therefore, the
accounts of that company must be fully consolidated in the Balance Sheet
and Statement of Earnings presentation of Berkshire. In previous reports,
our share of the net earnings only of Blue Chip had been included as a single
item on Berkshire’s Statement of Earnings, and there had been a similar
one-line inclusion on our Balance Sheet of our share of their net assets.

首先，是會計相關的議題，在年底與多元零售公司的合併後，對於公司的財務報表有
兩項影響，首先在合併案完成後，我們對藍籌郵票的持股比例將提高至58%左右，意
味著該公司的資產負債以及盈餘數字必須全部納到Berkshire的報表之內，在此之
前，我們僅透過權益法按投資比例認列藍籌郵票的淨值與收益。

This full consolidation of sales, expenses, receivables, inventories,
debt, etc. produces an aggregation of figures from many diverse businesses
- textiles, insurance, candy, newspapers, trading stamps - with dramatically
different economic characteristics. In some of these your ownership is 100%
but, in those businesses which are owned by Blue Chip but fully consolidated,
your ownership as a Berkshire shareholder is only 58%. (Ownership by others
of the balance of these businesses is accounted for by the large minority
interest item on the liability side of the Balance Sheet.) Such a grouping of
Balance Sheet and Earnings items - some wholly owned, some partly owned -
tends to obscure economic reality more than illuminate it. In fact, it
represents a form of presentation that we never prepare for internal use
during the year and which is of no value to us in any management activities.

如此全面性地將營收、費用、應收帳款、存貨及負債等科目合併，所產生的數字將來
自於各種產業特性截然不同的行業，包含紡織、保險、糖果、報紙及郵票等，某些行
業各位的持有的權益是100%，某些例如由藍籌郵票所持有的卻只有58%(至於其他股
東所代表的權益，則列在資產負債表右半邊負債科目的少數股東權益項下)，對於財務
報表這樣的歸類，我們認為非但無法解釋實際現況反而模糊了真正的焦點，事實上，
我們內部從來就不使用這樣的報表進行分析管理。

For that reason, throughout the report we provide much separate
financial information and commentary on the various segments of the
business to help you evaluate Berkshire’s performance and prospects.
Much of this segmented information is mandated by SEC disclosure rules and
covered in “Management’s Discussion” on pages 29 to 34. And in this letter
we try to present to you a view of our various operating entities from the
same perspective that we view them managerially.

基於這樣的理由，在接下來的報告中，我們將針對個別的行業提供各自的財務數字及
分析檢討，以協助各位評估Berkshire實際的表現及前景，這些資訊大都是證管會資
訊揭露的相關要求，詳見29頁到34頁的管理階層討論，至於在這裡我們則試著以經
營者的角度為各位分析各個營利單位的表現。

A second complication arising from the merger is that the 1977 figures
shown in this report are different from the 1977 figures shown in the report
we mailed to you last year. Accounting convention requires that when two
entities such as Diversified and Berkshire are merged, all financial data
subsequently must be presented as if the companies had been merged at the
time they were formed rather than just recently. So the enclosed financial
statements, in effect, pretend that in 1977 (and earlier years) the
Diversified-Berkshire merger already had taken place, even though the actual
merger date was December 30, 1978. This shifting base makes
comparative commentary confusing and, from time to time in our narrative
report, we will talk of figures and performance for Berkshire shareholders as
historically reported to you rather than as restated after the Diversified
merger.

合併案所引發的第二項影響則是今年報表中秀出1977年的數字與去年提供給各位同
一年度的數字有所不同，會計原則要求當像多元零售與Berkshire這樣二個獨立個體
合併時，所有報告的財務數字都必須假設這兩家公司原本就在一起，所以後續呈現所
有數字，是假設這兩家公司早在1977年(甚至更早以前)就已經合併，雖然真正合併
的日期是1978年的12月30日，這樣的改變使得比較性的評論很容易產生混淆，因
為以往的報告中，我們告訴各位的都是Berkshire的歷史記錄，而非依照合併多元零
售後重新修正數字。

With that preamble it can be stated that, with or without restated
figures, 1978 was a good year. Operating earnings, exclusive of capital
gains, at 19.4% of beginning shareholders’ investment were within a fraction
of our 1972 record. While we believe it is improper to include capital gains
or losses in evaluating the performance of a single year, they are an
important component of the longer term record. Because of such gains,
Berkshire’s long-term growth in equity per share has been greater than
would be indicated by compounding the returns from operating earnings
that we have reported annually.

然而即便在這樣的前提下，我們還是可以如此說，不論財報數字是否重編，1978年
都是豐收的一年，不含資本利得的營業利益約為期初股東投資成本的19.4%，雖然低
於1972年的歷史記錄，我們認為評估單一年度的表現，不適宜將資本利得或損失納
入計算，但不可否認他們卻是衡量長期績效的重要指標，拜這類利得所賜，Berkshire
每股權益長期的成長率遠大於每年年度營業利益所帶來的複利報酬。

For example, over the last three years - generally a bonanza period for
the insurance industry, our largest profit producer - Berkshire’s per share net
worth virtually has doubled, thereby compounding at about 25% annually
through a combination of good operating earnings and fairly substantial
capital gains. Neither this 25% equity gain from all sources nor the 19.4%
equity gain from operating earnings in 1978 is sustainable. The insurance
cycle has turned downward in 1979, and it is almost certain that operating
earnings measured by return on equity will fall this year. However,
operating earnings measured in dollars are likely to increase on the much
larger shareholders’ equity now employed in the business.

舉例來說，過去三年算是保險業的黃金歲月，這行業也是Berkshire獲利主要來源，
拜其所賜我們的每股淨值呈倍數成長，每年的營業利益與資本利得約當以25%的速度
增加，但我們不認為25%的股東權益年成長或19.4%營業利益的年成長可以維持多
久，保險業的景氣循環已於1979年開始反轉向下，所以今年的營業利益相較於股東
權益的比率很有可能會下滑，當然營業利益的金額還是會繼續增加。

In contrast to this cautious view about near term return from
operations, we are optimistic about prospects for long term return from
major equity investments held by our insurance companies. We make no
attempt to predict how security markets will behave; successfully forecasting
short term stock price movements is something we think neither we nor
anyone else can do. In the longer run, however, we feel that many of our
major equity holdings are going to be worth considerably more money than
we paid, and that investment gains will add significantly to the operating
returns of the insurance group.

相較於對短期營運的保守看法，我們對於目前保險子公司所持有的股票投資卻感到相
當樂觀，我們從來不會想要去預測股票市場的走勢，事實上，我不認為包含我自己本
身在內，有人能夠「成功」地預測股市短期間的波動，然而就長期而言，我們覺得我
們這些主要持股的價值終將遠超過我們當初投資的成本，而這些投資收益將會使得保
險事業的盈餘表現更上一層樓。