巴菲特給股東的信 1977年 Part 1

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致Berkshire公司全體股東:

Operating earnings in 1977 of $21,904,000, or $22.54 per share, were
moderately better than anticipated a year ago. Of these earnings, $1.43 per
share resulted from substantial realized capital gains by Blue Chip Stamps
which, to the extent of our proportional interest in that company, are
included in our operating earnings figure. Capital gains or losses realized
directly by Berkshire Hathaway Inc. or its insurance subsidiaries are not
included in our calculation of operating earnings. While too much attention
should not be paid to the figure for any single year, over the longer term the
record regarding aggregate capital gains or losses obviously is of
significance.

1977年本公司的營業淨利為2,190萬美元，每股約當22.54美元，表現較年前的預期
稍微好一點，在這些盈餘中，每股有1.43美元的盈餘，係藍籌郵票大量實現的資本利
得，本公司依照投資比例認列投資收益所貢獻，至於Berkshire本身及其保險子公司
已實現的資本利得或損失，則不列入營業利益計算，建議大家不必太在意單一期間的
盈餘數字，因為長期累積的資本利得或損失才是真正的重點所在。

Textile operations came in well below forecast, while the results of the
Illinois National Bank as well as the operating earnings attributable to our
equity interest in Blue Chip Stamps were about as anticipated. However,
insurance operations, led again by the truly outstanding results of Phil
Liesche’s managerial group at National Indemnity Company, were even better
than our optimistic expectations.

紡織事業的表現遠低於預估，至於伊利諾國家銀行的成績以及藍籌郵票貢獻給我們的
投資利益則大致如預期，另外，由Phil Liesche領導的國家產險保險業務的表現甚至
比我們當初最樂觀的期望還要好。

Most companies define “record” earnings as a new high in earnings per
share. Since businesses customarily add from year to year to their equity
base, we find nothing particularly noteworthy in a management performance
combining, say, a 10% increase in equity capital and a 5% increase in earnings
per share. After all, even a totally dormant savings account will produce
steadily rising interest earnings each year because of compounding.

通常公司會宣稱每股盈餘又創下歷史新高，然而由於公司的資本會隨著盈餘的累積擴
增，所以我們並不認為這樣的經營表現有什麼大不了的，比如說每年股本擴充10%或
是每股盈餘成長5%等等，畢竟就算是靜止不動的定存帳戶，由於複利的關係每年都
可穩定地產生同樣的效果。

Except for special cases (for example, companies with unusual debt-
equity ratios or those with important assets carried at unrealistic balance
sheet values), we believe a more appropriate measure of managerial
economic performance to be return on equity capital. In 1977 our operating
earnings on beginning equity capital amounted to 19%, slightly better than
last year and above both our own long-term average and that of American
industry in aggregate. But, while our operating earnings per share were up
37% from the year before, our beginning capital was up 24%, making the gain
in earnings per share considerably less impressive than it might appear at
first glance.

除非是特殊的情況(比如說負債比例特別高或是帳上持有重大資產未予重估)，否則我
們認為「股東權益報酬率」應該是衡量管理當局表現比較合理的指標，1997年我們期
初股東權益的報酬率約為19%，這比去年同期稍微好一點，但遠高於本身過去長期以
及當年美國企業整體的平均數，所以雖然我們每股的盈餘成長了37%，但由於期初的
資本也增加了34%，這使得我們實際的表現並沒有想像中那麼好。

We expect difficulty in matching our 1977 rate of return during the
forthcoming year. Beginning equity capital is up 23% from a year ago, and
we expect the trend of insurance underwriting profit margins to turn down
well before the end of the year. Nevertheless, we expect a reasonably good
year and our present estimate, subject to the usual caveats regarding the
frailties of forecasts, is that operating earnings will improve somewhat on a
per share basis during 1978.

我們預期未來年度將很難再達到1977年這樣的報酬率水準，一方面是因為期初資本
又增加了23%，一方面我們預期保險核保利潤率會在年底以前開始反轉，盡管如此，
大家還是可以期待豐收的一年，而我們現在的估計是，雖然預測有其先天上的限制，
我認為每股營業利益在1978年應該還有些許成長的空間。

Textile Operations

紡織事業

The textile business again had a very poor year in 1977. We have
mistakenly predicted better results in each of the last two years. This may
say something about our forecasting abilities, the nature of the textile
industry, or both. Despite strenuous efforts, problems in marketing and
manufacturing have persisted. Many difficulties experienced in the
marketing area are due primarily to industry conditions, but some of the
problems have been of our own making.

1977年紡織事業的表現依舊低迷不振，過去兩年我們樂觀的預期紛紛落空，這或許也
說明了我們預測能力的薄弱，或是紡織產業的本質，盡管一再地努力與掙扎，行銷與
製造的問題依舊存在，雖然市場上面臨的困境與產業情勢相關，但也有不少問題是我
們自己造成。

A few shareholders have questioned the wisdom of remaining in the
textile business which, over the longer term, is unlikely to produce returns on
capital comparable to those available in many other businesses. Our
reasons are several: (1) Our mills in both New Bedford and Manchester are
among the largest employers in each town, utilizing a labor force of high
average age possessing relatively non-transferable skills. Our workers and
unions have exhibited unusual understanding and effort in cooperating with
management to achieve a cost structure and product mix which might allow
us to maintain a viable operation. (2) Management also has been energetic
and straightforward in its approach to our textile problems. In particular,
Ken Chace’s efforts after the change in corporate control took place in 1965
generated capital from the textile division needed to finance the acquisition
and expansion of our profitable insurance operation. (3) With hard work
and some imagination regarding manufacturing and marketing
configurations, it seems reasonable that at least modest profits in the textile
division can be achieved in the future.

部份股東開始質疑我們是否應該繼續留在紡織產業，雖然就長期而言其投資報酬率明
顯低於其他的投資，但我們的理由有以下幾個：(1)我們在紐貝福及Manchester的工
廠都是當地最大的聘雇業者，員工的年齡偏高，缺乏轉換工作的能力，同時我們的員
工及其公會也已經盡其所能地與經營階層配合努力改善成本結構及產品組合，以使我
們的經營得以維持下去(2)管理階層也相當努力同時坦承面對產業的問題，尤其是在
1965年經營權易主後，Ken Chace依然盡力盡力地協助我們把紡織部門產生穩定的
資金流入轉到獲利更加的保險事業投資與購併之上(3)努力工作加上對製造與行銷組
合的樂觀預期，我們的紡織事業在未來看起來應該可以維持一個起碼的利潤空間。