巴菲特給股東的信 1978年 Part4

The homestate operation was disappointing in 1978. Our
unsatisfactory underwriting, even though partially explained by an unusual
incidence of Midwestern storms, is particularly worrisome against the
backdrop of very favorable industry results in the conventional lines written
by our homestate group. We have confidence in John Ringwalt’s ability to
correct this situation. The bright spot in the group was the performance of
Kansas Fire and Casualty in its first full year of business. Under Floyd
Taylor, this subsidiary got off to a truly remarkable start. Of course, it takes
at least several years to evaluate underwriting results, but the early signs are
encouraging and Floyd’s operation achieved the best loss ratio among the
homestate companies in 1978.

Homestate 1978年的營運讓人感到相當失望，雖然核保績效差，部份的原因要歸咎
於中西部意外發生的風暴，但是一向表現優異的傳統保單業務惡化的情況卻特別令人
感到憂心，我們對於John Ringwalt導正這種情況的能力有信心，堪薩斯火險第一個
完整會計年度不錯的表現讓我們吃下一棵定心丸，在Floyd Taylor的領導下，這個分
支單位有一個非常好的開始，當然至少要好幾年才能評估其真正的核保績效，但初步
的結果令人感到相當振奮，而Floyd 1978年的損失比率也是Homestate所有單位
中表現最佳的。

Although some segments were disappointing, overall our insurance
operation had an excellent year. But of course we should expect a good year
when the industry is flying high, as in 1978. It is a virtual certainty that in
1979 the combined ratio (see definition on page 31) for the industry will
move up at least a few points, perhaps enough to throw the industry as a
whole into an underwriting loss position. For example, in the auto lines - by
far the most important area for the industry and for us - CPI figures indicate
rates overall were only 3% higher in January 1979 than a year ago. But the
items that make up loss costs - auto repair and medical care costs - were up
over 9%. How different than yearend 1976 when rates had advanced over
22% in the preceding twelve months, but costs were up 8%.

雖然某些單位的績效令人感到失望，但總的來說，我們保險事業還是渡過了豐收的一
年，當然就像1978年一樣，在整個產業預期相對樂觀的情況下，我們還是期待來年
的豐收，幾乎可以肯定的是1979年整個產業的綜合比率(定義請參閱第31頁)將會上
揚幾個百分點，甚至有可能使得整個產業平均面臨核保損失的情況，比如以目前產險
業中最重要的車險業務來說，1979年一月顯示消費者物價指數僅比去年同期增加3
個百分點，但是損失成本-包含修理及醫療費用的支出卻上揚的9個百分點，這與
1976年物價指數上揚22百分點但相關成本僅增加8個百分點的情況，有很大的不
同。

Margins will remain steady only if rates rise as fast as costs. This
assuredly will not be the case in 1979, and conditions probably will worsen in
1980. Our present thinking is that our underwriting performance relative to
the industry will improve somewhat in 1979, but every other insurance
management probably views its relative prospects with similar optimism -
someone is going to be disappointed. Even if we do improve relative to
others, we may well have a higher combined ratio and lower underwriting
profits in 1979 than we achieved last year.

只有當費率增加的幅度與成本上揚的速度一致時，才得以維持穩定的利潤空間，但很
顯然1979年的情況並非如此，而1980年甚至有可能還會繼續惡化，我們現在的想
法是我們1979年的核保績效應該會比同業好一點，但其他保險同業或許也抱持著跟
我們相同的看法，所以可以肯定的是其他一定有人會失望，而就算我們比其他同業表
現要好一點，我們的綜合比率還是有可能進一步提高，使得我們1979年的核保利益
就去年衰退。

We continue to look for ways to expand our insurance operation. But
your reaction to this intent should not be unrestrained joy. Some of our
expansion efforts - largely initiated by your Chairman have been lackluster,
others have been expensive failures. We entered the business in 1967
through purchase of the segment which Phil Liesche now manages, and it still
remains, by a large margin, the best portion of our insurance business. It is
not easy to buy a good insurance business, but our experience has been that
it is easier to buy one than create one. However, we will continue to try both
approaches, since the rewards for success in this field can be exceptional.

另外一方面，我們還是不斷尋求增加保險業務的機會，不過各位對於我們這樣的企圖
千萬不要一面倒地感到高興，我們一些擴張的努力，大部分都是由我本人所發起的，
事後證明都是半調子，有的還付出昂貴的代價，事實上，經由買進Phil Liesche的業
務，我們在1967年進入保險事業，而到目前為止，這個部門還是我們所有保險事業
中表現最好的，實在是很難買到一家好的保險公司，但要創立一家更難，然而我們還
是會不斷地用各種方法，因為一旦成功所獲得的回報是相當驚人的。

Insurance Investments

保險事業的投資

We confess considerable optimism regarding our insurance equity
investments. Of course, our enthusiasm for stocks is not unconditional.
Under some circumstances, common stock investments by insurers make
very little sense.

我們必須承認對於保險事業的股票投資有點過於樂觀，當然我們對於股票的偏愛並非
毫無限制，在某些情況下，保險公司投資股票一點意義都沒有。

We get excited enough to commit a big percentage of insurance
company net worth to equities only when we find (1) businesses we can
understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest
and competent people, and (4) priced very attractively. We usually can
identify a small number of potential investments meeting requirements (1),
(2) and (3), but (4) often prevents action. For example, in 1971 our total
common stock position at Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries amounted to
only $10.7 million at cost, and $11.7 million at market. There were equities
of identifiably excellent companies available - but very few at interesting
prices. (An irresistible footnote: in 1971, pension fund managers invested a
record 122% of net funds available in equities - at full prices they couldn’t
buy enough of them. In 1974, after the bottom had fallen out, they
committed a then record low of 21% to stocks.)

只有當以下條件都符合時，我們才會想要將保險公司大部分的資金投入到股票投資之
上：(1)我們可以了解的行業(2)具有長期競爭力(3)由才德兼具的人士所經營(4)吸引人
的價格，我們常常可以找到一些符合(1)(2)(3)項條件的投資標的，但第(4)項往往讓我
們止步，舉例來說，1971年Berkshire所有股票的投資成本累計為1,070萬美元，
市價則為1,170萬美元，市場上確實有不少好股票，只是他們的價格通常也不便宜，
(講到這裡，我不得不補充，1971年全體退休基金經理人將可運用資金的122%投資
在高價股票之上，甚至還嫌不夠，但到了1974年，當股市大幅回檔時，他們投資在
股票的比例卻降到21%的歷史新低點)

The past few years have been a different story for us. At the end of
1975 our insurance subsidiaries held common equities with a market value
exactly equal to cost of $39.3 million. At the end of 1978 this position had
been increased to equities (including a convertible preferred) with a cost of
$129.1 million and a market value of $216.5 million. During the intervening
three years we also had realized pre-tax gains from common equities of
approximately $24.7 million. Therefore, our overall unrealized and realized
pre-tax gains in equities for the three year period came to approximately
$112 million. During this same interval the Dow-Jones Industrial Average
declined from 852 to 805. It was a marvelous period for the value-oriented
equity buyer.

然而過去幾年的情況完全相反，1975年底我們旗下保險事業持有的股票市值與
3,930萬美元的成本相當，到了1978年底股票部位(包含可轉換特別股)的投資成本
增加為1.291億美元，市價則為2.165億美元，在這中間的三年內，我們另外還實
現了2,470萬美元的資本利得，換句話說，這三年間，我們已實現與未實現的稅前資
本利得達到1.12億美元，相較之下道瓊指數在同一期間卻由852點跌至805點，對
於價值型投資人來說，這真是一段美好的歲月。