巴菲特給股東的信 1978年 Part5

We continue to find for our insurance portfolios small portions of really
outstanding businesses that are available, through the auction pricing
mechanism of security markets, at prices dramatically cheaper than the
valuations inferior businesses command on negotiated sales.

未來我們仍將持續為旗下的保險公司尋找真正優秀的事業，透過證券市場拍賣的價格
機制，以比協議買進整家公司更便宜的價錢，取得一小部份的股權。

This program of acquisition of small fractions of businesses (common
stocks) at bargain prices, for which little enthusiasm exists, contrasts sharply
with general corporate acquisition activity, for which much enthusiasm
exists. It seems quite clear to us that either corporations are making very
significant mistakes in purchasing entire businesses at prices prevailing in
negotiated transactions and takeover bids, or that we eventually are going to
make considerable sums of money buying small portions of such businesses
at the greatly discounted valuations prevailing in the stock market. (A second
footnote: in 1978 pension managers, a group that logically should maintain
the longest of investment perspectives, put only 9% of net available funds
into equities - breaking the record low figure set in 1974 and tied in 1977.)

這種以划算的價格取得部份所有權(即股票)的計畫，雖然不像透過談判購併整家公司
那麼有趣，但我們相當清楚，以目前的市場情況，很多公司因為透過協議談判的方式，
犯了明顯的錯誤，相較之下，我們以划算的價格買進不少公司的部份所有權，反而賺
了不少錢，(第二次補充，1978年許多退休基金經理人，原本最應該採取長期投資做
法的一群人，平均只將9%的資金擺在股票之上，創下比1974年更低的比例)。

We are not concerned with whether the market quickly revalues upward
securities that we believe are selling at bargain prices. In fact, we prefer just
the opposite since, in most years, we expect to have funds available to be a
net buyer of securities. And consistent attractive purchasing is likely to
prove to be of more eventual benefit to us than any selling opportunities
provided by a short-term run up in stock prices to levels at which we are
unwilling to continue buying.

我們並不在乎市場是否會立即反應這些股價被低估的股票，事實上，我們寧願價格不
要反應，因為通常我們不斷會有資金流入以供我們進場投資，持續不斷以便宜的價格
買進最終將證明比趁短期股價上揚出脫持股所賺取的利益更多。

Our policy is to concentrate holdings. We try to avoid buying a little of
this or that when we are only lukewarm about the business or its price.
When we are convinced as to attractiveness, we believe in buying worthwhile
amounts.

我們的投資策略是集中持股，我們試著盡量不要這也買一點，那也買一點，因為那樣
會使得我們對於被投資的產業漠不關心，當我們覺得價格合理，我們就會一口氣大量
地買進。

Equity holdings of our insurance companies with a market value of over $8
million on December 31, 1978 were as follows:

以下是1978年年底，我們旗下保險公司持股市價超過800萬美元的投資：

No. of

Shares Company Cost Market

---------- ------- -------- ----------

(000s omitted)

246,450 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. ... $ 6,082 $ 8,626

1,294,308 Government Employees Insurance Company

Common Stock ......................... 4,116 9,060

1,986,953 Government Employees Insurance Company

Convertible Preferred ................ 19,417 28,314

592,650 Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. .... 4,531 19,039

1,066,934 Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation 18,085 18,671

453,800 Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. .......... 7,534 10,267

953,750 SAFECO Corporation ...................... 23,867 26,467

934,300 The Washington Post Company ............. 10,628 43,445

---------- ----------

Total ................................... $ 94,260 $163,889

All Other Holdings ...................... 39,506 57,040

---------- ----------

Total Equities .......................... $133,766 $220,929

======= =======

In some cases our indirect interest in earning power is becoming quite
substantial. For example, note our holdings of 953,750 shares of SAFECO
Corp. SAFECO probably is the best run large property and casualty insurance
company in the United States. Their underwriting abilities are simply
superb, their loss reserving is conservative, and their investment policies
make great sense.

在某些情況下，我們間接持股的獲利能力變得相當的大，舉例來說，像是我們持有的
953,750股的SAFECO股票，該公司大概是目前全美最優秀的大型產物意外險公司，
他們的核保能力無與倫比，他們的損失準備提列相當保守，而他們的投資策略也相當
合理。

SAFECO is a much better insurance operation than our own (although
we believe certain segments of ours are much better than average), is better
than one we could develop and, similarly, is far better than any in which we
might negotiate purchase of a controlling interest. Yet our purchase of
SAFECO was made at substantially under book value. We paid less than 100
cents on the dollar for the best company in the business, when far more than
100 cents on the dollar is being paid for mediocre companies in corporate
transactions. And there is no way to start a new operation - with necessarily
uncertain prospects - at less than 100 cents on the dollar.

SAFECO的保險事業營運績效遠優於我們(雖然我們相信自己旗下部份公司的表現優
於其平均)，比起我們自己可以發展的還要好，同時也遠優於我們可以透過協議買下具
控制權的任何一家公司，然而我們仍然可以用遠低於其帳面價值的價格買到這些股
票，我們以折扣的方式買進這家最優良公司的部份股權，相較之下，你可能必須以溢
價的方式才能買到一整家表現平庸的公司，更何況先不考量不確定性，沒有人可以用
打折的方式自行成立一家新事業。

Of course, with a minor interest we do not have the right to direct or
even influence management policies of SAFECO. But why should we wish to
do this? The record would indicate that they do a better job of managing
their operations than we could do ourselves. While there may be less
excitement and prestige in sitting back and letting others do the work, we
think that is all one loses by accepting a passive participation in excellent
management. Because, quite clearly, if one controlled a company run as
well as SAFECO, the proper policy also would be to sit back and let
management do its job.

當然僅有少數的股權，代表我們無權去指揮或影響SAFECO公司的經營決策，但我們
為什麼要那樣做? 過去的記錄顯示他們營運管理的績效甚至比我們自己經營還要好，
雖然閒坐一旁看別人表現，難免有點無趣且有傷自尊，但我們認為這本來就是被動參
與某些優秀的經營階層所必須犧牲的，因為就算有人有幸得以取得SAFECO的控制
權，最好的方式還是坐在一旁讓現有管理階層自由發揮。